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Abstract According to theories of embodied cognition,
visual stimuli can either facilitate or impede the retrieval of
language meaning as multimodal perceptual simulations.
Here, we introduced a novel experimental paradigm to test
the hypothesis that moving stimuli (i.e., motion-defined
objects) facilitate coordination comprehension. Participants
read coordination descriptions and saw two colored lines
that matched the descriptions. Two figures then selected the
lines either by moving jointly along them or by standing
each on a different line. Moving selections yielded high
validation scores in conjunction trials and low validation
scores in disjunction trials, whereas stationary selections
yielded mitigated scores. The results demonstrate that
jointly moving stimuli, which are effective cues to visual
grouping, help retrieve and validate conjunction simula-
tions composed of dependent stimuli as well as retrieve and
invalidate disjunction simulations composed of indepen-
dent stimuli. These findings challenge accounts based on
truth-condition satisfaction that stimuli properties cannot
affect language comprehension and thereby reasoning.
Keywords Coordination ! Conjunction ! Disjunction !
Reasoning ! Simulation ! Truth conditions ! Motion-defined
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Introduction
A common assumption in the language comprehension lit-
erature is that logical expressions in natural language share
core semantic content with their counterparts in formal
logic. For example, the meanings of coordinators and and or
are assumed to parallel their formal definitions in terms of
relations between constituent parts, which are specified by
truth conditions (e.g., Fillenbaum 1974; Horn 1972; Keenan
and Faltz 1985). Knowing the meaning of a conjunction (the
purple and the black) or of a disjunction (the purple or the
black) implies knowing whether the constituent parts in
each expression obtain and whether they combine according
to valid truth conditions. Specifically, conjunction is valid
when it describes a visual display containing both a purple
object and a black object (the true–true TT condition) and
invalid otherwise. Also, disjunction is valid when it
describes a visual display in which one object is either
purple or black (the true–false TF and the false–true FT
conditions) and invalid when neither object matches the
colors mentioned (the false–false FF condition). As for TT
disjunctions, they are valid under the inclusive meaning and
invalid under the exclusive meaning. It is further a matter of
debate which meaning is the psychological default, that is,
the meaning individuals first access when hearing the word
or. We shall return to this issue below. Importantly, the
meaning-as-truth-conditions (MTC) account sets no further
cognitive or perceptual requirements on the stimuli descri-
bed by coordination expressions in order for comprehenders
to validate their description. In contrast, we show in the
current paper that such requirements are highly relevant and
set out to test the predictions of a different theoretical
framework using a novel methodology, namely the
embodied cognition approach using motion-defined objects
(i.e., jointly moving stimuli).
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Assumptions of the meaning-as-truth-conditions (MTC)
account
Language-comprehension theories inspired by the MTC
account assume that stimuli perceptual properties can only
affect the meaning of logical expressions insofar as the
cognitive effort they require interferes with the meaning
assignment process. Specifically, when selecting a meaning
out of several possible for a given utterance, compreh-
enders will favor a more informative albeit effortful
meaning over a less informative but effortless default if
perceptual stimuli are easy to process, but will stay with the
default if stimuli are difficult (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/
1995). For example, comprehenders may start by choosing
the default inclusive meaning of the disjunction word or in
‘There is a blue circle or a red circle’ and construct a
situation in which they see a blue circle or a red circle or
both (i.e., three possibilities). However, if given the time or
opportunity to compare disjunction meanings, compreh-
enders might choose the exclusive meaning instead and
construct a situation in which there is a blue circle or a red
circle, but not both (i.e., two possibilities, hence lower
ambiguity). Indeed, as shown in De Neys and Schaeken
(2007), individuals tend to assign less informative mean-
ings to logical expressions when visual stimuli burden their
executive cognitive resources needed for understanding
logical words. Specifically, their understanding of the
quantifier word some in the most unambiguous way as
some but not all was prevented when they attempted to
concurrently perform an unrelated task (i.e., memorize
complex dot patterns). A related prediction of the MTC
view is that, in situations that are spared meaning-assign-
ment dilemmas (e.g., TF and FT disjunction conditions),
stimuli properties can only affect response patterns ran-
domly if at all. The MTC view further predicts no quali-
tative differences in the online processing of conjunctions
and disjunctions, as stimuli properties can only affect later
comprehension stages (i.e., meaning assignment).
Another assumption of the MTC account is that, unless
linguistic expressions have singular meanings, one of their
meanings is the default. For instance, TT disjunction has
two meanings, inclusive and exclusive, of which the first is
generally considered to be the default. Nevertheless, results
of previous experimental studies are far from being con-
clusive on this point. Sternberg (1979), for instance,
established a marked preference for adults to interpret
disjunction exclusively in a sentence-picture verification
task. He secretly placed one, both, or neither of two objects
in a cardboard box and offered participants clues for
determining the box contents. When presented with dis-
junction clues pictured on poster boards and read aloud
(e.g., There is a circle in the box or there is a square in the
box), most adults rejected the conclusion, printed in a
booklet, that the experimenter had placed both a circle and
a square in the box. In an earlier study, Paris (1973) had
determined precisely the reverse, namely that participants
preferred to interpret disjunction inclusively, to the point of
wrongly rejecting trials where only one of two pictures
matched a disjunction description. Yet in a similar study,
Braine and Rumain (1981) obtained equivocal results.
They asked participants to judge the truth of statements
such as either there is a horse or a duck in the box, while
presenting them with the box contents. Slightly more adults
preferred an exclusive over an inclusive interpretation and
validated more trials where only one object was in the box.
Taken together, these findings challenge the MTC
assumption of default coordination meanings and encour-
age exploration of alternative accounts.
Assumptions of the embodied cognition (EC) account
The new account of coordination comprehension we
examine in the present paper illustrates the embodied-
cognition approach to language comprehension (Barsalou
1999; Barsalou et al. 2008). The main tenet of EC accounts
is that individuals understand language by constructing
multimodal perceptual simulations based on records, in
long-term memory, of neural activations that arise during
actual perception. Previous studies within the EC frame-
work have tailored their methodology to investigate sim-
ulations evoked by concrete as well as by abstract language
(for a review, see Glenberg 2007). For example, Zwaan
et al. (2002) showed that comprehenders mentally repre-
sent object shapes when hearing sentences about them
(e.g., The ranger saw the eagle in the sky) and thus respond
faster when the shape of an object in the visual display
matches the shape evoked in corresponding sentences (e.g.,
mentioning an eagle in the sky) than when it does not (e.g.,
mentioning an eagle in its nest). Also, as shown in Rich-
ardson et al. (2003), people consistently match certain
abstract verbs (e.g., ‘respect’) to the image of a vertically
oriented object and other abstract verbs (e.g., ‘argue’) to
the image of a horizontally oriented object. These and other
studies suggest that language offers top-down cues to
sensory perception. Indeed, research using brain imaging
techniques has revealed that specific areas of the (pre)-
motor cortex become active during language comprehen-
sion (Hauk et al. 2004; Tettamanti et al. 2005). Other
studies have shown that incidental exposure to words
implying vertical motion affects relevant low-level vision
(e.g., Meteyard et al. 2007) and that category labels pro-
duce top-down feedback that activates visual features
previously stored with the category (Lupyan 2008).
The EC-based account of coordination comprehension
we present here also assumes the primacy of language in
online processing of combined visual and linguistic
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information (e.g., the visual world paradigm) as well as the
principle that, in turn, sensorimotor experience shapes
formation and retrieval of coordination simulations. We
propose that, since people are often prompted to select both
items mentioned when hearing a conjunction (e.g., Have a
cup of coffee and a biscuit!), they are likely to represent
conjunction as a single perceptual object (cf. Link 1983)
and hence simulate conjoined items as parts of the same
conceptual unit. Likewise, because people are often
prompted to choose between alternatives when hearing a
disjunction (cf. Braine and Rumain 1981; Fillenbaum
1974; Simons 2001), they are likely to represent disjunc-
tion (e.g., Have a biscuit or a fruit!) as two independent
objects. Importantly, EC accounts make no assumptions
relating to default meanings but only specify the conditions
that stimuli must fulfill such that comprehenders may
safely recover the meanings of associated linguistic
expressions. Fluctuations in validation scores reflect the
goodness of fit between stimuli types as well as individu-
als’ willingness to validate ambiguous information.
Our proposal builds on previous findings from the
visual search literature detailing differential effects trig-
gered by conjunction tasks compared with disjunction
tasks. Treisman and Gelade (1980), for instance, reported
that visual search for targets defined by one or more
disjunctive features (e.g., blue or curved) occurs in par-
allel across a spatial display, whereas search for targets
defined by a conjunction of features (e.g., red and verti-
cal) requires a serial scan through items in the display.
More recently, Dumitru et al. (2013) used the visual
world paradigm to highlight distinct visual sampling
patterns associated with conjunction expressions as well
as with disjunction expressions. The authors showed that
saccades to the second of two stationary targets presented
together in a visual display were launched later when the
second target was mentioned in disjunction sentences than
in conjunction sentences. For example, when hearing
Nancy examined an ant or a cloud, participants shifted
their gaze from the picture of an ant to the picture of a
cloud significantly later than when hearing Nancy exam-
ined an ant and a cloud. The results by Dumitru et al.
(2013) align well with findings from visual processing
studies that there is no cost involved in shifting attention
between two object parts, but that there is a marked cost
in shifting attention between two objects (Egly et al.
1994; Lamy and Egeth 2002).
Visual-search studies have also identified perceptual
grouping cues that may influence the search for conjoined
features (e.g., Bundesen 1990; Duncan and Humphreys
1989; Treisman and Sato 1990). Further, motion was
shown to be a particularly effective cue that helps per-
ceivers distinguish two items from each other and from a
background in visual scenes and hence determine whether
two items are dependent or independent (Nakayama et al.
1995; Jiang et al. 2000; Johnson and Pashler 1990; Nissen
1985; Quinlan 1998; Sagi and Julesz 1985; Simons 1996).
A large body of research has confirmed that humans per-
ceive items that move together as being more related to
each other, compared with items that move independently
or that are stationary.
Testing the EC account of coordination
To test the predictions of the EC account relating to the
role of perceptual information in early comprehension,
that is, in retrieving the meaning of conjunctions and
disjunctions (i.e., the perceptual simulations they evoke),
we developed an experimental paradigm including both
stationary and moving stimuli. Moving stimuli were
motion defined in the sense that they were objects created
by gestures, hence imaginary entities. For example, to
describe the path taken by a train (e.g., the engine fol-
lowed by a single wagon) arriving at a railway station, we
could move both hands simultaneously from left to right.
In our study, dynamic trials involved two cartoon-like
figures that jointly selected two visual stimuli by moving
along them. Participants’ task was to decide whether
conjunction and disjunction descriptions of two colored
lines (the TT condition) were true or false depending on
whether strong grouping cues were present (i.e., figures
moving jointly) or not (i.e., motionless figures). We pre-
dicted that differences in validation rates for conjunction
and disjunction descriptions would be greatest when
visual cues favor single grouping, which is compatible
with conjunction meaning, than when visual cues are
weak and allow either single or double grouping. We
therefore expect high validation scores in moving TT
conjunction trials but low validation scores in moving TT
disjunction trials, as well as mitigated scores across sta-
tionary trials, where participants could not determine with
great certainty whether two stimuli are dependent or
independent. The remaining conditions (TF, FT, and FF)
served as controls, but we may not rule out scoring dif-
ferences between stationary and moving trials in valid
conditions (TF and FT disjunction). Response times
should be orthogonal to coordination type or truth con-




Forty-four volunteering students participated in individual
sessions lasting up to 30 min in return for course credit.
Cogn Process (2014) 15:397–403 399
123
They were all native speakers of English and reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 96 visual displays, each containing a
pair of colored lines placed horizontally next to each other
(e.g., a purple line to the left and a black line to the right).
Each line ended in an arrow serving as a cue to the
direction in which figures could move. Line pairs were
accompanied by a conjunction description (e.g., the purple
and the black) or by a disjunction description (e.g., the
purple or the black), as seen in Fig. 1. Line colors matched
the description in all conditions except the FF condition. In
half of the trials, a pair of globe-shaped figures selected one
line (in the TF/FT conditions) or both lines (in the TT
condition) by moving together along them like a train on
rails. In the remaining trials, the figures selected one or
both lines by simply standing on them.
Design and procedure
The experiment followed a 2 (Coordination: Conjunction
vs. Disjunction) 9 4 (Condition: TT vs. TF vs. FT vs.
FF) 9 2 (Selection: Stationary vs. Moving) factorial
design. Participants were seated comfortably at approxi-
mately 40 cm from the computer screen and were informed
that written descriptions were directions for the figures to
follow and that, on each trial, they should first read the
description and then watch carefully how the figures select
the lines. Subsequently, they should press the right button
of a response box if they believed that the figures had
followed the directions and the left button otherwise
(counterbalanced). The structure of a trial was as follows.
First, the word ‘Ready’ appeared in the center of the screen
for 1,000 ms, followed by a 500-ms blank screen, then by a
visual display featuring lines and figures. In dynamic trials,
the figures started moving after 2,000 ms. Stationary dis-
plays or final displays after figures had stopped moving
remained onscreen until response. The experiment con-
sisted of 6 practice trials and 96 experimental trials pre-
sented in individually randomized orders in two equal
blocks. The dependent variable was the proportion of




Figure 2 shows the proportion of correct responses across
trials. We coded correct responses as ‘1’ and incorrect
responses as ‘0’. By convention, ‘yes’ responses in dis-
junction TT trials were coded as ‘correct,’ although both
‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses are logically valid. We first con-
ducted logistic regression analyses of results in the TT
condition of interest, in order to determine whether
Fig. 1 Example of the sequence of events in the true–true (TT)
disjunction condition. In moving trials (left-side image), the globe-
shaped figures moved together like a train on rails over both colored
lines (here, the left line is purple, and the right line is black), thereby
suggesting that lines are perceptually dependent (form a single unit).
In stationary trials (right-side image), the figures stood each on a
different line, thereby suggesting that lines may be perceptually
independent (form two units). In control conditions (not represented
here), the figures selected one line in true–false/false–true (TF/FT)
conditions and either one or both lines in false–false (FF) conditions.
The colors mentioned matched line colors in all conditions except the
FF condition. Conjunction trials were identical to disjunction trials
save for the word ‘or,’ which was replaced by the word ‘and’ in
written descriptions
400 Cogn Process (2014) 15:397–403
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selection type may be a predictor of response type (‘yes’
vs. ‘no’).
The odds ratio of validating moving versus stationary
conjunction trials was 13.22 (Wald v2 = 55.19, p\ .001).
Conversely, the odds ratio of validating stationary versus
moving disjunction trials was 3.27 (Wald v2 = 40.38,
p\ .001). We also conducted logistic regression analyses of
results in the TF/FT condition. As expected, selection type
was a significant predictor of response type in disjunction
trials—the odds ratio of validating moving versus stationary
trials was 5.08 (Wald v2 = 40.26, p\ .001)—but not in
conjunction trials (odds ratio of 1.64, Wald v2 = 2.64,
p = .104). Also as expected, selection type was not a sig-
nificant predictor of response type in the FF condition, neither
in conjunction trials (odds ratio of validating moving vs.
stationary trials was 4.04,Wald v2 = 1.55, p = .213) nor in
disjunction trials (odds ratio of validating moving vs. sta-
tionary trials was .709,Wald v2 = .338, p = .561).
Response latency scores
Figure 3 summarizes response latency scores across TT
trials. A 2 9 2 (Selection x Connective) ANOVA revealed
a main effect of selection, F (1, 43) = 361.37, p\ .001,
g2p = .894 (M = 974 ms for moving trials, CI between
882 ms and 1,066 ms vs. M = 2,020 ms for stationary
trials, CI between 1,887 ms and 2,154 ms), indicating that
stationary stimuli are difficult to process, and an interaction
between factors, F (1, 43) = 17.32, p\ .001, g2p = .287,
which was driven by the slightly larger differences between
disjunction and conjunction processing in moving trials,
F (1, 43) = 26.72, p\ .001, g2p = .383 (M = 859 ms, CI
between 774 and 944 ms vs. M = 1,090 ms, CI between
972 and 1,207 ms) compared with stationary trials F (1,
43) = 361.37, p = .034, g2p = .100 (M = 2,095 ms, CI
between 1,929 and 2,260 vs. 1,946 ms, CI between 1,813
and 2,079 ms).
Discussion
We investigated whether moving stimuli facilitate coordi-
nation comprehension and reasoning in a study inspired by
EC accounts using a novel experimental paradigm (i.e.,
motion-defined objects). The experimental results con-
firmed our predictions that mitigated scores should obtain
in stationary TT trials, as these are contexts where com-
prehenders cannot determine whether visual stimuli are
dependent (form a single perceptual unit) or independent
(form two perceptual units) and hence whether they cor-
respond to the simulations evoked by conjunctions (i.e., a
single object) or by disjunctions (i.e., a double object).
Results also confirmed our predictions that jointly moving
stimuli should elicit high validation scores in TT con-
junction trials and low validation scores in TT disjunction
trials, as these are contexts where comprehenders can
easily determine that stimuli are dependent. Our findings
suggest that experimental designs with moving stimuli can
be successfully used to predict coordination validation
rates, as motion is a reliable cue to inter-stimulus depen-
dency. Dependency status is a variable that was not prop-
erly controlled for or that was overlooked in previous work.
Indeed, coordination studies have used exclusively static
contexts (e.g., symbols written in booklets, objects placed
in boxes, or drawings on slides), where dependency status
could not be determined.
The question that arises at this point is whether meth-
odological flaws may have caused discrepancies across
results in previous studies independently of the validity of
the MTC account or whether the latter may be genuinely
flawed. Our evidence so far points to the latter possibility.
In particular, our findings challenge two MTC assumptions,
namely that coordination expressions have default
Fig. 3 Response latencies and standard deviations for true–true (TT)
conditions
Fig. 2 Proportion of correct responses and standard deviations across
true–true (TT) conditions and across control true–false/false–true (TF/
FT) and false–false (FF) conditions
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meanings that are captured by truth conditions and that
stationary trials are difficult to process for reasons unre-
lated to early comprehension (i.e., unrelated to meaning
retrieval). The first assumption was already difficult to
sustain in the light of results reported in previous coordi-
nation studies (e.g., Braine and Rumain 1981; Paris 1973;
Sternberg 1979), which were unclear as to why individuals
may sometimes adopt an inclusive default meaning for
disjunctions and at other times an exclusive default
meaning. Similarly, it is unclear how the MTC view can
accommodate response patterns for TT conjunction trials in
our study. In particular, response latencies were twice as
high in stationary trials compared with moving trials,
indicating considerable processing difficulty. Nevertheless,
it is in these contexts that we observed default meaning
override for TT conjunctions, to use terms agreeable with
the MTC view. Hence participants’ preference for invali-
dating conjunction descriptions in such contexts would
reflect a basic tendency to override the single meaning
available for TT conjunctions, which is untenable.
The results of our study also challenge another assump-
tion of the MTC view that stimuli perceptual properties
affect the late stages of online comprehension. Specifically,
the response patterns we obtained for valid control condi-
tions (requiring a ‘yes’ response), namely for TF and FT
disjunctions, lend support to our hypothesis that stimuli
perceptual properties directly affect meaning (i.e., simula-
tion) retrieval. Recall that the MTC account predicts no
effect of stimuli properties on validation rates other than
random errors in these conditions. Nevertheless, validation
scores were significantly lower in stationary than in moving
trials, even though comprehenders would not be prompted
to making a choice between logically valid alternatives
neither in TF nor in FT conditions.
Instead, we propose that visual stimuli properties affect
meaning retrieval, which is an early phase of comprehension.
Put differently, conjunction anddisjunctiondonothavedefault
and derived meanings but evoke each a single meaning—one-
object and two-object perceptual simulations, respectively—
which can be retrieved either partly or fully, depending on
context and task requirements. Therefore, comprehenders who
validate TT disjunction descriptions, for instance, are not
thereby selecting the ‘inclusive’ meaning, but merely
acknowledging that visual stimuli match the simulation
evoked by disjunction. Similarly, comprehenders who reject
TT disjunction descriptions are not selecting the ‘exclusive’
meaning, but merely acknowledging that visual stimuli do not
match disjunction simulation. We further propose that, in
difficult tasks or contexts (e.g., stimuli with poor visual reso-
lution, multitasking), individuals act as optimistic assessors
(somemore than others—for an introduction to optimism bias,
see Sharot 2012) who assume, without adequate evidence, that
stimuli properties necessary for successful simulation retrieval
only appear to bemissing. From this perspective, inclusive and
exclusive disjunction meanings (i.e., ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers)
reflect the degree to which comprehenders are able to retrieve
coordination simulations based on stimuli perceptual proper-
ties as well as on their willingness to accommodate or fill in
missing information.
This brings us to the last point wewish to focus on, relating
to individual differences in response patterns. For TT dis-
junction trials, for instance, 22 % of participants consistently
failed to validate them, while about 6 % validated them
across the board, suggesting that not all individuals were
sensitive to grouping cues or that theywere not using them for
meaning retrieval. Indeed, findings from visual-search stud-
ies suggest that individuals differ in their ability to process
visual information (e.g., Treisman and Gelade 1980, experi-
ment VII). Further, elements defined by their color may be
searched preferentially in relation to stimuli defined along
other dimensions (e.g., Hannus et al. 2006; Poisson and
Wilkinson 1992; Zohary and Hochstein 1989). For example,
Williams (1966) investigated eye fixations involved in a
search task in which stimuli were defined by a conjunction of
size, color, or shape. He showed that, even when prompted to
search for a particularly colored shape, participants still fix-
ated more readily on stimuli defined by their color.
Conclusion
We determined that stimuli properties directly influence
coordination validation rates in a study using concurrent
visual and linguistic information. We thereby provided
support for an embodied cognition account of coordination
featuring object-like simulations. Further research will
determine whether similar results obtain when stimuli
belong to other perceptual modalities, either combined or in
isolation, as when people listen to spoken language without
looking at corresponding visual displays, for instance. It
also remains to be determined whether other cues to object
identification besides dependent or independent motion
may help retrieve coordination simulations and how sparse
these simulations could be in order to be retrieved safely.
We may find either that simulations evoked by coordinators
(and other abstract concepts) are tied to a specific modality
or that these simulations can be easily represented in vari-
ous modalities, in which case they must be inherently
sparser than those evoked by concrete objects.
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